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Despite the prevalence of state-based approaches to security studies
during the Cold War, alternative ways of thinking about securityF
focusing on the individual and societyFalso developed during this time
period. However, in the post-Cold War era the primacy of the state in
considerations of security has come under increasing challenge from a
variety of perspectives. In this essay, the development of the study of
individual and societal dimensions of security is traced and discussed
against the background of the end of the Cold War. The first part of the
essay examines the evolution of thinking about individual and societal
dimensions of security during the Cold War. The second part focuses on
the post-Cold War revival in thinking about these aspects of security.
The essay concludes by considering the future of world politics
conceived of as a ‘‘risk society’’ and the implications for individual and
societal dimensions of security.
The concept of security has traditionally been related more to states than to people.
Since the seventeenth century, when the current system of states began to emerge,
international security has been understood and practiced with reference to the
needs and interests of states. Although, in its early origins, the state was conceived
as an instrument for producing security for its citizens, it became the subject of
security with the establishment and retrenchment of the state-system. Notwith-
standing the alternative conceptions of security that have always existed, this state-
based and external-directed conception of security has prevailed and shapes the
practices of governments. Critical voices calling for the importance of protecting
human beings or the global environment aside, twentieth-century thinking and
practices concerning security were characterized by this way of thinking. The
emphasis the United Nations has put on sovereignty and the inviolability of
territorial boundaries can be viewed as an indication of the institutionalization of
this approach.
Even though state-based conceptions of security have taken precedence,
alternative ways of thinking that give priority to individual and societal dimensions
of security have also been proposed. In this essay, the evolution of the study of
individual and societal dimensions of security is traced and discussed against the
background of the end of the Cold War. The first part looks at the development of
thinking about the individual and societal dimensions of security during the Cold
War by examining three major contributors to the dialogue on this topic and their
ideas, namely, the Commission on Global Governance and its conception of
‘‘common security,’’ academic peace research and their proposal regarding ‘‘stable
peace,’’ and Third World security approaches. The second part of the essay focuses
on the post-Cold War revival in thinking about security by identifying key issues
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and approaches around which debates have been structured, including ‘‘whose
security?’’ ‘‘primary referents,’’ ‘‘security as emancipation,’’ ‘‘insecurity dilemma,’’
‘‘societal security,’’ ‘‘human security,’’ and ‘‘agents of security.’’ The essay concludes
by considering the future of world politics conceived of as a ‘‘risk society,’’ and




Mikhail Gorbachev’s adoption of the precepts of common security not only made
the headlines but also brought this idea to the forefront of world politics during the
1980s. Common security is based on the notion that security must be sought and
maintained not against one’s adversaries but with them. This approach is necessary
because states, in searching for security, end up making themselves more insecure
by enhancing their military power, which in turn causes others to feel insecure and
increase their military power in response: the classic security dilemma (Herz 1950;
Wheeler and Booth 1992). Common security seeks to mitigate the security dilemma
by organizing policies concerning security in coordination with others to maximize
mutual as opposed to unilateral security.
The need for such coordinated activity was heightened in the Cold War
environment by the imminent threat of global nuclear catastrophe. Olaf Palme, in
his introduction to the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament
and Security Issues (1982:ix) titled Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament,
wrote:
Our alternative is common security. There can be no hope of victory in a nuclear
war, the two sides would be united in suffering and destruction. They can survive
only together. They must achieve security not against the adversary but with him.
International security must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than on
a threat of mutual destruction.
By putting common security into practice, Gorbachev changed the Soviet approach
to arms control, accepting sufficiency rather than seeking parity with the United
States (Allison 1991). Accordingly, the Soviet Union was able to make unilateral
concessions to reduce their arms, which in turn took away the West’s threat and
paved the way for the end of the Cold War.
Stable Peace
Although it was students of common security who emphasized the need for global
security and pointed to its nonmilitary dimensions, academics involved in peace
research laid the intellectual groundwork for these ideas by producing studies that
focused on individuals and social groups as referents for security. Students of peace
research also suggested alternative security practices (that is, nonmilitary, nonzero
sum, nonviolent approaches), putting special emphasis on peace education and the
role of the intellectual (Garrison and Phipps 1989; Dunn 1991; Rabinowitch 1997).
Works by Johan Galtung and Kenneth Boulding were critical in urging us to
consider individual and societal dimensions of security. According to the maximal
approach introduced by Galtung (1969), peace did not just mean the absence of
war; it was also related to the establishment of conditions for social justice. In
making this point, Galtung distinguished between personal and structural violence.
The latter is defined as those socioeconomic institutions and relations that oppress
human beings by preventing them from realizing their potential. Violence, for
Galtung (1996:197, emphasis in the original), is all those ‘‘avoidable insults to basic
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human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs
satisfaction below what is potentially possible.’’ Moreover, he defined cultural
violence as those mechanisms that render acceptable both direct violence (as in
killing, repression, and delocalization) and structural violence (as in exploitation,
penetration, and marginalization). Thus, Galtung turned both the use of violence
and the ways in which violence is legitimized by the society into a subject of study.
By adopting a broader definition of violence and an approach that focused on
human needs, he and other students of peace research shifted the focus away from
the state and the military dimension of security to individuals and social groups and
their needs.
Galtung underlined the futility of trying to achieve peace without tackling the
structural causes of the insecurity of individuals and social groups as well as states.
Distinguishing between negative and positive peace, he argued that peace defined
merely as the absence of armed conflict is negative peace. Positive peace,
maintained Galtung (1996:32), means the absence of both direct (physical) violence
and indirect (structural and cultural) violence. He emphasized that to attain positive
peace, it is not enough to seek to eliminate violence; existing institutions and
relations must be geared toward the enhancement of dialogue, cooperation, and
solidarity among peoples coupled with a respect for the environment.
Kenneth Boulding’s (1978) conception of stable peace was invaluable in
emphasizing that peace maintained through the use of threat and force cannot
be stable. He explained stable peace by comparing it with unstable peace (that is,
peace maintained through threatening mutual annihilation, namely nuclear
deterrence). Unstable peace is defined as a condition in which no real expectations
exist that peace (understood as the mere absence of armed conflict) will be
maintained in the future. Stable peace, in contrast, exists when two sides learn how
to make peace by creating trusting relationships that disarm people’s minds as well
as their institutions. Such relationships, argued Boulding, can stand the stress of
crises that threaten to tear them apart because everyone has a firm expectation
regarding the nature of future relations.
Another contribution of peace researchers was their emphasis on the increasing
inappropriateness of established ways of thinking about security given the security
concerns of individuals and social groups in the West. The practices of Western
European peace movements during the 1970s and 1980s served to drive this lesson
home (see Kaldor 1997). This concern was shared by students of Third World
security, who maintained that Western-oriented, state-based approaches to security
were unable to address the security needs and interests of states as well as nonstate
actors in the Third World. These Western approaches focused on East–West
stability and its maintenance through nuclear deterrence and nuclear power
balancing, whereas Third World states sought to reject the automatic categorization
of their problems into an East–West framework.
Third World Security Approaches
Students of Third World security have criticized the almost exclusive focus on crises
and conflicts that has comprised the established (Cold War) ways of thinking about
security. They are concerned about the neglect of longitudinal security proces-
sesFthe processes of development through which the security of individuals and
social groups are maintained (Al-Mashat 1985). Galtung’s stress on the structural
causes of insecurity struck a chord with Third World policymakers in an era
marked by the formation of the nonaligned movement, the Group of 77, and calls
for a New International Economic Order at the United Nations. The nonaligned
movement emphasized the differences between their security agendas and that of
the superpowers. The ideology of the movement constituted a fundamental
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During the 1980s, some students of Third World security took up these issues
once again (see, for example, Thomas and Saravanamutu 1989; Sayigh 1990).
Caroline Thomas (1987) differentiated between two approaches to security. The
first approach was adopted by those states in the developed world that were
relatively satisfied with the status quo and saw security mainly in terms of its
maintenance. They privileged the stability of the existing system as a foremost
security concern. The second and more holistic approach, argued Thomas, was
adopted by those states in the Third World that included economic, political, and
environmental issues in their security agenda. The search for security in the Third
World was mostly about maintaining domestic security through state-building and
establishing secure systems for dealing with food, health, money, and trade as much
as it was about building up the military. Accordingly, many (but not all) Third World
states saw a change in the status quo not necessarily as a threat but rather as
conducive to securityFprovided, of course, that the change was toward the
creation of an international economic structure sensitive to the needs of developing
states.
Although the distinction Thomas drew between the security needs and the
interests of developed and developing states is helpful, the reader should note that
not all developing states were against the status quo. Indeed, it was not always the
case that Western conceptions of security were top-down, whereas those of the
Third World were bottom-up. Rather, there were both developed and developing
states (and nonstate actors) among those that propagated top-down views of
security. For instance, when some Third World policymakers spoke of the need to
address the nonmilitary dimensions of insecurity, they often meant the need to put
limits on the exercise of democratic freedoms for purposes of state consolidation.
The practical implication of this state-based approach to security was the
government’s domination over society in which the public’s sacrifices were viewed
as obligations. The state’s privileges, in turn, were justified as being necessary to its
survival. Accordingly, those who dared to challenge the security practices of their
states and focused on individual or societal dimensions of security were margin-
alized at best; they were accused of treachery and imprisoned at worst.
Bottom-up views of security voiced by nonstate actors in the Third World did not
get heard unless the groups adopted violent practices in an attempt either to form a
state (as the Palestine Liberation Organization did) or to capture state power in
their own countries (as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah did). The efforts of
groups, like the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, that undertook grassroots
activism during the 1980s by setting up a network of medical clinics and charitable
associations to serve the poorest and most crowded localities not reached by the
government were clouded by the violent practices that characterized most of their
activities in the period following the 1991 elections.
However, some significant exceptions to this generalization exist. Gandhi
captured the world’s attention as well as its sympathy during the period that
preceded India’s independence (see Barash 2000). More recently, the Zapatistas
have been successful in getting their voices heard through mostly nonviolent
means. They chose to represent the enormous poverty and misery the Chiapas
have gone through by adopting the language of the anti-globalization movements
around the world. By timing their demonstrations for the day of the beginning of
the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the Chiapas successfully
pointed to the detrimental effects of globalization in general and to its impact on
indigenous peoples in particular (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional 2002).
Much of the critical thinking (and practices) surveyed above remained on the
margins throughout most of the Cold War. Critics of Cold War security thinking
were themselves criticized for their normative or political approaches to
international phenomena (Bilgin 1999). Only in the post-Cold War period have
these issues been revived once again by students of security who seized on the
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opportunity presented by the disappearance of the Soviet threat to broaden the
security agenda and to point to threats faced by individuals and social groups.
Post-Cold War Revival in Security Thinking
The end of the Cold War provoked a long overdue interest in rethinking
commonly held assumptions as well as practices concerning security (see, for
example, Baldwin 1995; Tickner 1995). The 1990s witnessed a proliferation of
works that focused on the individual and societal dimensions of security (for
example, Buzan 1991; Sorensen 1996; Bilgin, Booth, and Jones 1998; Buzan,
Waever, and Wilde 1998; Krause and Williams 1998). Academics who were critical
of established ways of thinking about security called for dropping the traditional
assumption that security could be understood and practiced within an interstate
framework. Post-Cold War approaches turned toward frameworks that looked at
the threats faced by nonstate actors (individuals, social groups, the global society) as
well as states. Arguments were made that ‘‘International Security’’ might no longer
be the best label for a field reconstructed as such. Because the word ‘‘international’’
suggests an interstate framework that is no longer the locus of the security
problems faced by many actors around the globe, the phrases ‘‘global security’’ and
‘‘world security’’ were proposed as alternative formulations.
In the post-Cold War era, the academic debate on security was accompanied by
practitioners’ increasing interest in ‘‘human security,’’ which in turn was warranted
by a series of developments that were visible during the Cold War but became more
apparent in its aftermath. These developments included (a) growing disparities in
economic opportunities both within and between states; (b) increasing hardships
faced by peoples in the developing world who found themselves on the margins
of a globalizing world economy; (c) diminishing nonrenewable resources leading
families and groups to become refugees; (d) rising anti-foreigner feelings and
violence in reaction to migration pressures from the developing to the developed
world; and (e) proliferating intrastate conflicts increasing public interest in, and
pressure for, humanitarian intervention. Furthermore, it was not only an increase
in public awareness of the aforementioned developments but also growing
consciousness of the costs incurred as a result of the kinds of security practices
produced by the established ways of thinking that provided the impetus for an
alternative approach.
In the post-Cold War era, a range of actors including academics, the United
Nations, and nongovernmental organizations explored individual and societal
dimensions of security. What follows is a discussion of the key issues and approaches
that arose during the 1990s.
Whose Security?
In the post-Cold War era, academic studies on security took a more sociological
approach than before. In a pathbreaking article, Ken Booth (1991) questioned
whose security existing approaches were designed to address. Depending on the
referent, security analyses point to different threats and prescribe different
solutions. For example, from the perspective of a superpower concerned with
the maintenance of its regional and global interests in the post-September 11
environment, it is the so-called rogue or failed states that constitute the major threat
to international security because they can provide hideouts to terrorist networks
(National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002). In effect, state failure
has found itself a place on top of the US security agenda in the aftermath
of the September 11, 2001, attacks. Previously, failed states were considered to
be problems only when their situation became acute enough to threaten the
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anti-Western stance in an attempt to alleviate problems with domestic cohesion by
diverting attention away from their internal problems to those involving foreign
and security policy (as Iraq did in 1990), were labeled rogue states, and the problem
was addressed accordingly (Bilgin and Morton 2002).
Consider US President George W. Bush’s (2002) definition of the main threat to
international security as the ‘‘the axis of evil,’’ which comprises three countries
FIraq, Iran, and North KoreaFrepresented as ‘‘outlaw regimes that possess and
are developing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons as well as the missiles to
deliver them.’’ These three countries, according to President Bush, are viewed as
constituting a threat to international security not only because of their destructive
potential, but also because of their support for international terrorism and the
repression of their own people. From the perspective of peoples in the region,
however, who took to the streets to demonstrate against US policies toward Iraq
and Israeli policies toward the Palestinians, it is human rights violations, economic
injustice, and political oppression that constitute the major threats to their security.
Indeed, from the perspective of a Saudi woman, it might not be an Iraqi weapon of
mass destruction program but her own government’s policies that lower her life
expectancy. From the point of view of Egyptian schoolchildren, the accumulation of
weapons systems threatens their security primarily by directing valuable resources
away from their education and their families’ health care.
The stark contrast between the security interests of governments and
individualsFthe so called ‘‘scuds versus butter’’ dilemma all Middle Eastern
governments must face (Sadowski 1993)Fis also voiced by Moroccan author,
Fatima Mernissi (1992:169), who has asked: ‘‘How can Arab women hope to
overcome opposition in their societies and go out in search of paid work if the
economies of their countries are devoting a large part of their wealth to
unproductive expenditures like the importation of weapons that don’t even serve
any useful purpose, as the Gulf War amply demonstrated?’’ Viewed through her
lenses, those extra-regional governments who sell the weaponry, those regional
governments who give high priority to regime security and invest in the military,
and those individuals and social groups who dare not challenge the status quo out
of fear of the changes that democracy and human rights may introduce into their
daily lives could all be considered partners in this crime committed against
individuals’ security. In sum, the simple question ‘‘whose security?’’ has provoked a
lively debate on whether individuals should replace states as the primary referent of
security.
Individuals as the Primary Referents of Security
Assessing the differences between individuals’ and governments’ security concerns,
Booth (1991) argued that individuals’ security should come first. In advancing his
case, he made three interrelated points. First, states cannot be assumed to act as
providers of security at all times because some are willing to make significant
portions of their population insecure in an attempt to secure themselves
(for example, the Iraqi government that violates the human rights of its own
people), and others fail to respond to the needs of their citizens (for example,
Somalia). In other words, the security of the state is not necessarily synonymous
with that of the people who live within its physical boundaries. Second, even those
states that fit the textbook definition by standing guard over their populace
are generally doing so as a means to an end, not as an end in itself. Third, and
finally, differences among states in both character and capacity make them unlikely
to engage in a comprehensive approach to security. Indeed, state-based approaches
to security do not allow us to examine the insecurities of individuals and
communities within state borders, thereby glossing over a range of suffering in
security analyses.
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Martin Shaw (1993) responded to the question of whether the state or the
individual should be the primary referent of security by arguing that our options
need not be limited to two: the state or the individual. He maintained that we need
a complex and multilayered analysis of a variety of referents including social groups
and the global society as well as individuals and states. In making this point, Shaw
emphasized the need to develop an understanding of the dynamic relationships in
which these potential referents interact and affect each other’s security. In other
words, he advocated that ‘‘social relations’’ was the missing dimension in the
security debate.
This point was taken up by Bill McSweeney (1999) who maintained that security
policies could not be formulated simply by aggregating individual needs or by
attributing such needs to states. Rather, he made a case for a ‘‘reflexive theory of
social order’’ that views the analysis of security as a dynamic process in which
identities and interests are mutually constituted by social agents in search of
security. Thus, McSweeney’s proposed framework looked at individual human
beings and communities not only as referents (whose security we should be
concerned with) but also as agents who seek to enhance their own and others’
security. This framework enabled him to understand how individuals and
communities interact, and how new and broader communities are constructed as
solutions to security problems through the manipulation of identities and interests
by purposeful social agents (as with the formation of the European Union and the
attempts to bring peace to Northern Ireland).
Security as Emancipation
Booth’s (1991) proposed solution to the current state of insecurity was to develop a
framework that did not simply reproduce existing threats (as when containment
policies produce rogue states and, in worst case scenarios, become self-fulfilling
prophecies). Specifically, Booth (1991:319) placed human beings at the center and
gave priority to human emancipation:
‘‘Security’’ means the absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of people (as
individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop
them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of war
is one of those constraints together with poverty, poor education, political
oppression, and so on.
Booth substantiates his argument by asserting that emancipation is in the spirit of
our times, as witnessed by the end of the Cold War and the end of apartheid in
South Africa as well as the progress in struggles that are still in progress (for
example, in Israel-Palestine and Afghanistan).
Mohamed Ayoob (1995) responded to Booth’s call for adopting an emancipation-
oriented approach by observing that such a practice would amount to imposing a
model originating in the West onto Third World contexts. Ayoob (1995:11) argued
that Third World states are the opposite of those found in the Western world that
have ‘‘largely solved their legitimacy problem and possess representative govern-
ments that preside over socially mobile populations that are relatively homogenous
and usually affluent and free from want.’’ Accordingly, he called for continuing to
give highest priority to the security needs and interests of states and regimes in the
Third World.
Although it goes without saying that major differences occur between the security
needs of different types of states, emancipationFas defined by Booth (1991)Fis
not an added extra that can only be sought in those Western polities that are
presumably free from want. On the contrary, emancipation is understood as a
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during state-building and the making of security policy. Thus, the need for
strengthening existing state mechanisms in the Third World should not be made an
excuse for marginalizing individuals’ and social groups’ needs. The challenge for
emancipation-oriented approaches to security is to find a way of addressing the
security needs and interests of a variety of referents at different levels (see Bilgin,
Booth, and Jones 1998).
When adopting an emancipation-oriented approach to the study of security, one
confronts the problem of trying to define what emancipation means in different
parts of the world (Pasha 1996). Even well-intentioned efforts could be viewed as
adopting a patronizing attitude toward peoples of other cultures. Suggesting that
issues such as human rights or the provision of basic education and health care
should be a part of the security agenda could be taken as a claim to know peoples’
real interests better than they themselves do. However, presenting citizens with
choices that have been obscured by state-based approaches to security may also be
interpreted as a claim to know what peoples’ real interests are. Given the ways in
which dominant discourses have shaped security agendas, one could reasonably
assume that regional security agendas could have been set up differently had other
(individual and societal-focused) discourses come to prevail.
Insecurity Dilemma
The security predicament of individuals and social groups was also pointed out by
Brian Job (1992) who observed that the security environment of the majority of the
world’s population did not improve with the end of the Cold War and the
disappearance of the superpower conflict. Indeed, people in the developing world,
who constitute a significant portion of the globe’s population, continue to suffer
gross injustices, often at the hands of their own governments. According to Job,
simply criticizing governments or pointing to societal insecurities is not going to
help students of security understand this complex problem. The security dilemma
of Third World states is often rooted in their colonial past and currently sustained
by the international system. Hence, a need exists for an alternative framework that
can provide a better analytical handle on the security problems of peoples in the
Third World. This framework, Job believed, could be built around the concept of
‘‘insecurity dilemma.’’
Job’s (1992) argument is that the security dilemma metaphor hinders more than
it reveals when used within the Third World context. The security dilemma is
premised upon the distinction between what goes on within and what goes on
outside a country. It assumes that the inside of the state is safe and that threats come
from outside state boundaries. However, this inside–outside distinction makes little
sense in the Third World where international boundaries are safeguarded by the
constitutive norms of international society (namely, sovereignty, the nonviolability
of borders, and nonintervention) whereas domestic threats dominate governmental
security agendas. In such cases, the concept ‘‘insecurity dilemma’’ provides an
enhanced understanding of the difficulties faced in the Third World where ‘‘states
are preoccupied with internal rather than external security, and weak states have a
guaranteed existence in what is supposedly an anarchic international system’’ ( Job
1992:18). Accordingly, Job called for a more comprehensive framework to
understand the insecurities faced by individuals and social groupsFa framework
that would allow students of security to understand the ways in which security
problems in the developing world are created by the developed world and
sustained by the norms and institutions of international society.
Job’s argument is in contrast to that of Ayoob (1995) who stresses the primacy of
political-military considerations in the developing world and has called for us to
give the highest priority to the needs and interests of these states until
governmental mechanisms become strong enough to allow them to compete with
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other states. Following Job, one could point to a number of problems involved in
adopting such policies. First, strengthening the mechanisms of states that often turn
their machinery against their own people amounts to neglecting the security
concerns of individuals and social groups. Second, trying to strengthen state
mechanisms in a world constantly being reshaped by the forces of globalization and
fragmentation represents an enormous challenge. Third, attempting to strengthen
state mechanisms without raising the awareness of international actors regarding
their complicity in the current condition of Third World states is likely to prove
futile. Similar problems have been raised by the critics who have called for
rethinking the institutions and norms of global governance to tackle the insecurities
of peoples in the developing world (see the section below on human security).
Societal Security
‘‘Societal security’’ is another concept designed to address the limitations of existing
conceptual tools in analyzing contemporary developments. Societal security as a
concept grew from debates about security in Europe in the post-Cold War era. It
was developed as a conceptual approach by a group of scholars affiliated with the
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (Waever et al. 1993) whose research was
stimulated by developments unleashed by the end of the Cold War and the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. They were concerned that ‘‘nation’’ and ‘‘state’’ do
not mean the same thing in a majority of countries around the world and that
‘‘national security’’ is becoming an increasingly irrelevant framework with which to
study post-Cold War developments in Europe. In its stead, they proposed the term
‘‘societal security’’ and a focus on the insecurities of societiesFunderstood as
national, ethnic, or religious communities.
Established understandings of security have assumed state and society to be
synonymous. The tension between the security needs and interests of the state and
of the society is resolved by assuming that the state, the society, and the nation are
one and the same. Post-Cold War developments such as the ethnic separatism and
cleansing in Yugoslavia and the emergence of domestic resistance to the expansion
of the European Union have demonstrated, however, that the security needs and
interests of the state and society do not always coincide. When there is a clash of
interests between the two (as with the anti-European sentiments being raised in
various EU member states) or competing claims to sovereignty within the same
state (as in the former Yugoslavia), the ‘‘national security’’ framework is not very
helpful as a guide for the study and practice of security (see, for example, Posen
1993). In such conflicts, what is secured is an idea, a ‘‘we’’ feeling. Society becomes
the subject of security.
Ole Waever (1993:23) defined societal security as the ‘‘ability of a society to
persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual
threats. . . . the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of
traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national
identity and custom.’’ The break-up of the former Yugoslavia is often used to
illustrate how such societal insecurities can lead to violent conflicts (see, for
example, Wiberg 1993). Although the 1991 crisis in Yugoslavia had a number of
causes (including economic decline, constitutional conflicts, and ethnic discord) that
had been glossed over by the communist regime, it is argued that the effective cause
was the competing societal identities of the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenians (Ramet
1996). Following the end of the Cold War, each of these groups chose to view each
other’s identity as the threat in an attempt to strengthen their own sense of who
they were, thereby giving rise to a dynamic that resembles the security dilemma.
The difference between this process and the classic security dilemma is that instead
of threatening each other by building their militaries, the constituent societies of the
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identities. This method of using ethnonational symbols to strengthen the idea of
nationhood (‘‘we’’ feeling) among one’s own populace led to neighbors feeling
threatened and, in turn, adopting similar policies to strengthen their own identity.
The wars that resulted in the break-up of Yugoslav indicate the ways in which
security and identity dynamics interact.
In the case of the former Yugoslavia, it was different societal groups that viewed
each other as threatening. In some other cases, it is state action itself that is viewed
as the source of societal insecurity. Take, for example, the case of the European
Union during the 1990s. As European integration gained pace, a growing
divergence between the security concerns of communities and governments
emerged. Some viewed the push for integration at the governmental level as
jeopardizing the economic and cultural interests of different parts of their societies
(for instance, French farmers protesting against European agricultural products or
the British hesitancy to drop their national currency and adopt the euro). The
government’s pro-European Union stance gave rise to societal insecuritiesFhence,
the need to develop an understanding of the different priorities demanded by a
state focus (sovereignty) versus a society focus (identity).
The European Union case also demonstrates how policymakers respond to
societal insecurities that are caused by changing patterns of international migration
and the rising interest in and sensitivity to the security dimensions of refugee
movements (Buzan 1993). During the 1990s, migration became a concern not just
for North America and Oceania (regions that have been receiving migrants for a
long time) but for almost all countries of the world. It is estimated that by the end of
the 1990s, more than two percent of the world’s population was living outside their
country of birth (Poku and Graham 2000). The ensuing mix of populations has
given rise to paranoia and xenophobia in some countries, as evidenced by the rise
of the far right in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, and more
recently France.
In particular, the export of security issues from home to host countries has
turned migration into a security problem for EU policymakers in the post-Cold War
era (Bilgin forthcoming). The rise in the levels of crime and disorder are often
blamed on immigrant populations even though research has shown that
these groups have no higher rates of crime than the host populations (Graham
2000). Furthermore, growing unemployment in the European Union has fueled
anti-immigrant feelings among the unemployed. The difficulties involved in
meeting the educational and social needs of members from a different culture
have created further problems. All these issues have became rallying points for
radical groups and conservative political parties in the member states of the
European Union. Governments that were late in recognizing the increase in
these feelings found themselves at odds with their populace. They faced the
dilemma of having to choose between adopting restrictive anti-immigrant
regulations (and risk being criticized for antidemocratic and antihuman rights
practices) or accepting low-skilled immigrants from other cultures (and
enduring the criticisms of the conservatives about weakening the social fabric of
their society).
Consider, for example, the leader of the National Front in France, Jean-Marie Le
Pen, whose presidential campaign capitalized on popular concerns about crime and
immigration. He took 17 percent of the vote in the first leg of the French
presidential elections and came second only to the leader of the center-right,
Jacques Chirac. Arguably, the rise of the far right in France is a phenomenon that
can be explained with reference to societal insecurity. Social groups in France who
felt threatened by crime and immigration (as well as the loss of jobs) were led to
view these issues as threats to their identity. It is in this sense that the concept of
societal security helps us understand under what conditions societies may become
significant as political actors. Furthermore, by examining societal security, we are
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able to discern how societal identities can arise that are independent of the state and
in reaction to the identity the government seeks to emphasize.
Having made these points, one can also point to a number of difficulties with
giving high priority to the insecurities of societies, especially for policy purposes.
First is the problem of having to judge the competing identity claims of different
national, ethnic, and religious groups. When Bosnians, Serbians, and Croatians
perceive threats to their identity as the cause of the conflict over Bosnia-
Herzegovina, how do we decide who is the aggressor and who is the victim? After
all, the societal security dilemma metaphor suggests that all parties are victims. Yet,
as the debates of the early 1990s regarding whether or not to intervene into Bosnia
showed, an inability to answer this question delayed much needed humanitarian
action.
Second, when societal security is used to guide policy, society becomes reified and
treated as constant and unchanging. Such a fixed conceptualization is a problem
because the main contribution of societal security as an alternative approach to
thinking about security results from the attention paid to the ways in which society
constitutes itself in an attempt to secure its identity. To deal with this problem, the
concept of societal security needs to allow for a more fluid notion of societyFas a
process of negotiation, affirmation, and reproductionFinstead of as an objective
reality or independent variable. Along these lines, McSweeney (1999) has proposed
that we refuse to privilege claims to separate identity in security analyses: ‘‘the
security problem is not there just because peoples have separate identities; it may
well be the case that they have separate identities because of the security problem’’
(McSweeney 1999:73, emphasis in the original). Thus, clashes over identity are not
the cause but the outcome of a process through which conflicts over economic and
political interests are reframed and presented in terms of identity.
Following McSweeney, the concept of societal security should be further
developed to allow students of security to understand how societies create and
re-create their identities and interests through practice. Such an approach would
allow us to understand how people, who have lived side by side for years, could
turn against each other and define their neighbors as the source of their societal
insecurityFas in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 1990s. It would also help us learn
how people who fought two world wars in less than fifty years could choose to
redefine their identities and interests in a way that permitted them to construct a
security communityFas in Western Europe in the aftermath of World War II
(Waever 1998).
Human Security
The concept of ‘‘human security’’ emerged out of the recognition that individuals
and communities’ security does not necessarily follow from the security of the state
in which they are citizens. On the contrary, the genocidal records of some states and
the gross injustices in the distribution of resources in others suggest that states can
constitute a major threat to their own citizens’ well-being. If governments fail to
cope with persistent poverty and illiteracy, their policies become a source of
insecurity by lowering people’s life expectancies and decreasing their opportu-
nities. Such practices have caused experts to suggest that in some parts of the world
the bedrock assumption of security, namely that what goes on inside the state is
peaceful and what goes on outside is anarchic, has been turned on its head. As
Robert Jackson (1992:93) has maintained, ‘‘instead of states or alliances defending
their populations against external threats, international society is underwriting the
national security of states, whether or not they convert it into domestic security for
their citizens.’’
An early recognition of the difficulty of reconciling the needs and interests of
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Commission on Global Governance (1995:22–23) titled Our Global Neighborhood.
The commission maintained that the security of states and individuals should not be
viewed as mutually exclusive in that ‘‘states cannot be secure for long unless their
citizens are secure.’’ Thus, the commission’s recommendation favored upholding
the right of states to security while at the same time making the protection of people
and their security one of the aims of global security policy.
This dual focus in the wording of the commission is in contrast with the United
Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) (1994) Human Development Report. The
UNDP report pointed out two ways in which the concept of security should be
changed: (1) the stress put on territorial security should be shifted toward people’s
security, and (2) security should be sought not through armaments but through
sustainable development. The report made four points concerning the need to
move away from a national security approach toward an approach that emphasizes
human security. First, the authors of the UNDP report presented human security as
a universal concern that is relevant to people across the world regardless of
geographical location. The process of globalization has created a third world within
the first world as well as a first world within the third world. Second, the report
maintained that the components of security are interdependent; distress in one part
of the world is likely to affect other parts of the world. Third, human security is best
ensured through prevention rather than intervention after the crisis takes its toll.
Fourth, the report argued that the referent for security (that is, the focus for
security thinking and practices) should be the people rather than states.
This fourth point is the most radical as far as the history of the United Nations is
concerned. After all, the need to adopt a more people-based approach to security
was recognized early by the founders of the United Nations. According to the
United Nations Development Program (1994:24) report, after the San Francisco
conference that set up the United Nations, the US Secretary of State reported to his
government that:
The battle for peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front
where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social
front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can
assure the world of an enduring peace. . . . No provisions that can be written
into the Charter will enable the Security Council to make the world secure from
war if men and women have no security in their homes and their jobs.
The difference between this statement from the 1940s and the one from the 1990s
is that in the former the central concern for practitioners was the achievement of
enduring peace understood as stability. Accordingly, individual human beings’
security was viewed as important insofar as it threatened international stability.
Although in the 1990s, the United Nations still gives priority to enduring peace, its
human security approach is designed to ensure that an international economic
breakdown (such as the one in the 1930s that preceded World War II) does not
recur. Moreover, the authors of the UNDP report are more open in urging a move
away from a state-centric approach that seeks peace understood as stability toward a
people-centric approach that seeks peace through change (however incremental it
may be).
Thus, the UNDP report is clearer than that of the Commission on Global
Governance (or the founders of the United Nations) as to whose security they
ascribe utmost priority. More recently, the Secretary General of the United Nations,
Kofi Annan (1999), also embraced human security as a strategic guide to action and
pointed to the existing conception of state sovereignty and the narrow and often
self-centered definition of national interest as obstacles to effective action for human
rights in humanitarian crises. Annan introduced the concept of ‘‘individual
sovereignty’’ to try to deal with the first of these obstacles. Individual sovereignty
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comprises the human rights and fundamental freedoms of each and every person
as already enshrined in the United Nations Charter. With reference to national
interest, Annan (1999) is quoted as having said, ‘‘in a growing number of challenges
facing humanity, the collective interest is the national interest.’’ For the United
Nations, then, human security is a strategic term used to direct attention to
humanitarian crises whose daily death toll shames humankind into action.
Annan and others who discuss human security have not yet given us a formal
conceptualization of the term nor attempted to bring an order to existing
definitions (see Suhrke 1999). Rather, human security is used as a slogan to
emphasize the need for intervention when governmentsFfor reasons of national
securityFwithhold action. In this sense, Annan and others have tried to make use
of security as an evocative term to direct attention to problems faced by individuals
and social groups during humanitarian catastrophes.
While holding the presidency of the United Nations Security Council, Canada
put the issue of human security on the agendaFa first in UN history (Suhrke 1999:
266; See also Axworthy 1977). The United Nations had discussed the issue of
violence against civilians during armed conflict many times before, but never had
humanitarian principles and the issue of intervention been opened to such a
universal discussion. This change in the UN approach was not only enabled, but
necessitated by the end of the Cold War. It was enabled in the sense that, during the
Cold War, intervention into political conflicts was considered a high-risk venture
because of the superpower rivalry. The possibility was always present that an
interstate conflict could escalate into a superpower conflict. The end of the Cold
War removed such fears. The end of the Cold War also necessitated consideration
of human security because the end of the superpower rivalry meant the cessation of
superpower interest in conflicts in far away places that did not necessarily impinge
on their national interest. For these reasons, intervention on humanitarian grounds
emerged as an effective alternative to the previous approaches.
In addition to the United Nations, Canada and Norway also have taken up
human security as a foreign policy toolFan act reminiscent of the 1960s Canadian–
Norwegian cooperation on UN peacekeeping issues. Indeed, during the 1990s
human security emerged as a strategic way to bring together a variety of actors with,
at times, diverse interests. For Canada, human security has provided a strategic
rationale for maintaining a certain level of military force deemed critical by the
Ministry of Defense. The concept has also enabled the Canadian government to
polish its image as a ‘‘soft power’’Fan image created by Canada’s active
participation in international peacekeeping efforts. Similarly, observers have
viewed Norwegian advocacy of human security as a search for ‘‘humanitarian
great power status’’ (Suhrke 1999).
As defined by the Canadian and Norwegian governments, human security
includes human rights and international humanitarian law as well as socioeconomic
development based on equity. The latter does not appear on the UN’s
humanitarian agenda, focusing as it does on issues related to intervention. For
other countries, such as Jordan, human security provides a buzzword to repackage
and put on the international agenda the age-old dilemma of having to choose
between channeling resources into the military or using them in the civilian sector.
Jordan for a long time has called for a region-wide effort to end the Middle East’s
arms race. In 1991, Jordanian policymakers proposed to link debt reduction and
arms control (the so-called arms-for-debt proposal) in an attempt to break out of
the vicious circle: debt breeds poverty, poverty fuels violence, violence stimulates
competitive arms purchases, which in turn increase foreign debt (Sadowski 1993).
Notwithstanding the appeal of an arms-for-debt swap for many governments,
the proposal was overshadowed by the breakthrough in Israeli–Palestinian
negotiations in Oslo. In this sense human security can be viewed not only
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interests but also as a strategic tool for actors to use in pushing forward their own,
often domestic, agendas.
Changing the primary referent of security from states to human beings has
implications for understanding the sources of threats and formulating policies to
cope with those threats. Although human security may serve as a useful strategic
tool for some policymakers to bring their own priorities to the world’s attention,
finding solutions to such problems requires action at the global level. Yet, global
governance institutions are often perceived by peoples in the Third World as biased
and Western in orientation. As Thomas (2001) has argued, putting a human
security approach into practice requires taking steps toward democratizing global
governance, which in turn involves moving toward more inclusive, bottom-up, and
participatory politics. This point raises the question: ‘‘Who are the agents of
security?’’
Agents of Security
Thomas (2000) considers the involvement of civil society actors in reviewing and
democratizing global governance as a must. Indeed, it is worth qualifying Booth’s
statement quoted above (‘‘states should be treated as means not ends’’) by observing
that states should be treated as means, but not the only means. Yet, established ways
of thinking about security remain oblivious to the potential that nonstate actors
have as agents of security (Bilgin 2002).
The prominence of the state’s agency in the economic and financial sectors has
long been challenged, but it has yet to be dethroned in certain types of security
matters. There are a number of reasons for this problem. First, states have a
monopoly over the legitimate use of violence in international society. Second, they
are considered well equipped to meet threats to security. Third, our analytical
lenses have become conditioned to focus on states in the analysis of security.
Because established ways of thinking about security have been state-based,
external-directed, and military-dominated, students of security have privileged
the state as agent in their analyses. But the record of the last fifty years shows that
states are increasingly less able to provide for their security on their own. Indeed,
they have resorted to military alliances or collective security organizations to cope
with threats of a military nature. The recognition of such limits to the state’s agency
requires fresh answers to the question of who are the agents of security.
Although established ways of thinking about security do not have much to say
about the agency of nonstate actors, the latter have challenged the security agendas
set up by governments for a long time. Indeed, the organized actions of nonstate
actors have been referred to as ‘‘foreign policy from below’’ or ‘‘grassroots
statecraft’’ in the literature (see Marsh 1995). One can distinguish between four
different forms of action. Some actors seek to alter the policies of foreign
governments by getting their own government to exert pressure, such as the anti-
Apartheid movement that sought to change the US government’s policy toward
South Africa in an attempt to end apartheid. Other actors directly intervene in the
affairs of a foreign government, as do Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch. Also consider those individuals that cross borders to form organizations that
are transnational in character. Greenpeace is a good example of such an
organization. And, finally, some individuals challenge their government’s policies
as well as the global security agenda (see, for example, the actions of the women of
Greenham Common described below).
The point is that a broader security agenda requires us to look at the activities of
agents other than the state, such as social movements, nongovernmental
organizations, and transnational citizens. Such an examination is essential not only
because states are not always able or willing to fulfill their side of the bargain in
providing for their citizens’ security, but also because agents other than states are
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already striving to provide for the differing needs of peoples (themselves and
others).
Twenty-First Century Security in a Risk Society
It is often suggested that a major source of current insecurities is rooted in a certain
lack of imagination among power-holders around the world. Established ways of
thinking about security have so far hindered attempts to move away from states as
the primary referents and agents of security. Thus, a change in mindsets is required
to become fully aware of the importance of the individual and societal dimensions
of insecurity and to take remedial action.
Another source of humanity’s current insecurities is a lack of self-reflection; that
is, people remain unaware of the ways in which they themselves constitute their
own threats. Ulrich Beck (1992, 1999) has explored this phenomenon in his work
on the ‘‘Risk Society’’ and has presented us with a new framework within which to
analyze social change and its security implications.
Risk Society
Risk is defined by Beck (1999:21) as ‘‘a systematic way of dealing with hazards and
insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself.’’ Modern industrial
society has manufactured and perpetuated its own risks by defining and calculating
acceptable levels of risk. Viewed as such, risks emanate not only from sources that
are beyond human beings’ control (such as earthquakes), but they are also human-
made insofar as they are rooted in the knowledge produced by experts worldwide
(such as environmental pollution). Beck (1999:6) explains his argument with
reference to the risks created by the prevalence of neoliberal economics:
The past decade has shown that the dogmatic free-market economics imposed
throughout the 1980sFand to which every world and national forum has since
signed upFhas exacerbated environmental risks and problems just as much as
central planning from Moscow ever did. Indeed free-market ideology has
increased the sum of human misery. On the back of crucial free-trade pacts like
the WTO and NAFTA, for example, consumption is now virtually out of control
in the richest countries. It has multiplied six times, according to the UN. The
richest 20 per cent of the people are consuming roughly six times more food,
energy, water, transportation, oil, and minerals than their parents were.
These are human-made risks, manufactured by deciding what is controllable and
what is beyond control. The latter are treated as threats that need to be met
through emergency measures whereas the former do not enter the security agenda.
We, as human beings, are aware of the dangers involved in a free-market economy
(as demonstrated by the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s), yet we regard them as
controllable. Thus, our own definitions and scientific calculations define what are
viewed as acceptable levels of risk in our societies.
Framing the future of nuclear weapons in contemporary world politics provides
us with a way to illustrate this process of manufacturing risks. Policymakers in the
nuclear powers have so far made use of state-based conceptions of security to gloss
over the serious risks involved for their citizens in the production and stockpiling of
nuclear weapons. In a manner rather oblivious to the threats to the security of
individuals and communities, it has been (and still is) argued that nuclear weapons
are the ultimate weapon for maintaining international security. It is further argued
that the advent of nuclear weapons enhanced security during the Cold War. At the
root of such arguments is an external-directed and state-based conception of
security. Nuclear weapons are viewed as tools with which to manage risks that
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those borders are often neglected. Yet, the production and stockpiling of nuclear
weapons threaten the lives of the people who are directly involved in the process.
The exact costs of the Cold War nuclear arms race on the people who were
involved in weapons production in the United States and the Soviet Union is still
not known. Nor do we know the costs incurred by those who lived near nuclear
weapons facilities, or by uranium miners. Still, thanks to archival research, we now
have some ideas concerning how often the world came to the brink of nuclear
catastrophe during the Cold War, as part of attempts to maintain international
security understood as stability in superpower relations. In other words, the very
same weapons that were designed to maintain security have led to insecurities for
those who participated in their production or stockpiling as well as for the rest of
the world’s population who did not know how fragile nuclear command and
control systems really were (Sagan 1993; Lopez and Myers 1997). Thus, following
Beck, it could be argued that policymakers have considered these kinds of threats,
directed against the security of people (as individuals and communities),
controllable in order to render acceptable the dangers involved in continuing to
produce, stockpile, and oversee nuclear weapons. In other words, these risks were
considered appropriate because they were deemed necessary to defend the world
against greater threats (that is, those risks that were viewed as uncontrollable).
A concrete example of this phenomenon was witnessed during the 1980s when
the British government agreed to the US request to place cruise missiles in Britain.
The women of Greenham Common reacted by challenging this state-based
approach to security and pointing out the human costs involved (see Sylvester
1994). In 1981, women marched 110 miles from Cardiff in Wales to Greenham
Common in Bekshire to protest against the NATO decision to site cruise missiles at
the Royal Air Force base located there, which had become a base for the United
States Air Force. On arrival, the women set up their Peace Camp outside the main
gate of the base. Between 1981 and 1983, the protesters concentrated on disrupting
construction work at the base by such acts as blockading the base and cutting down
parts of the fence. In 1983 when the missiles arrived, so did women from all parts of
the United Kingdom bent on ridding the Common of nuclear weapons and the
military through nonviolent action.
The significance of the Greenham Womens’ protest was partly due to its mastery
of nonviolent techniques and partly due to the way they subverted the language of
security and risk used by policymakers. For instance, one of the banners of the
protesters read: ‘‘Take a risk for peace now.’’ By way of this banner, the protesters
indicated the human-made character of risks, that no 100 percent risk-free world is
possible, and that policymaking regarding security always entails management of
some risks. Another banner, which read ‘‘hospitals for today, not the day after,’’
suggested the ways in which governments manage risks by emphasizing certain
kinds of threats (that is, those posed against the security of the state) while putting
off certain others (that is, those posed against the well-being of individuals).
The attempts of the Greenham Common women to emphasize the threats to
people’s security resulting from governmental policies can be understood within
the framework provided by Beck. The difference between Beck’s approach and
that of traditional academic peace researchers (who have also emphasized
individuals’ concerns) is that Beck allows students of security to analyze the ways
in which threats do not just exist ‘‘out there’’ but suggests how they are
manufactured by human beings themselves. The implication is that individuals
and social groups may challenge prevalent risk assessments made by governments
and direct attention to their own insecurities.
Beck’s general proposition is that what we are encountering in the contemporary
era is the emergence of a worldwide risk society in which risks are distributed
unevenly across the globe and that politics has become a major tool through which
such risks are processed. According to Beck, it is not merely the omnipresence of
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risks that defines this risk society, but also the way it forces world politics to focus on
risk management. The goal for a range of actors has become trying to foresee and
control the future consequences of human action.
‘‘Take a Risk for Peace Now’’
Calls for addressing the individual and societal dimensions of security have been
widely criticized. It has, for instance, been argued that shifting the focus away from
states and military threats to individuals and their security is only desirable when
threats such as the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program no longer exist. But
so long as they do, policies should be adopted to deal with them first. The argument
goes that this type of threat has the potential to cancel out all other lofty concerns.
This line of reasoning was prevalent in Western Europe (among other places)
during the Cold War, and students doing peace research who called for rethinking
the East–West relationship were often considered disloyal for failing to stand by
their compatriots in the face of the Soviet threat.
This type of argument remains prevalent in the twenty-first century Middle East,
where women (among others) are made to feel guilty for voicing their own security
concerns at a time when the threat posed by Israel remains. In this sense, using
military threats against state security to justify governmental neglect of the
individual dimension of security in itself constitutes a threat to the security of
individuals and social groups by making it more difficult for people to voice their
concerns. Furthermore, although the events of September 11 could be used to
show that traditional threats remain and need to be addressed, the same events can
also be viewed as pointing to the need for alternative approaches that would deliver
stable peace in Boulding’s (1978) terms (Bilgin 2001). After all, terrorism (especially
when used by those who have little to lose against those who have a lot to lose) is a
threat for which no effective solution has yet been found.
In response to such criticisms, Booth (1999) has maintained that paying attention
to the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction is a must so long as this focus
does not lead to the neglect of other concerns that touch the lives of individuals.
Understanding the differences between these two cultures of securityFidentified
by Booth as the ‘‘culture of nuclearism’’ and the ‘‘culture of human rights’’Fhas
become the challenge for students of security in the twenty-first century:
Global nuclear war remains the possibility that could cancel out all other human
possibilities. By contrast, a universal human rights culture is the possibility that
could help reinvent all other human possibilities. This clash of cultures is at the
heart of competing constructions of security, and is fundamental to the future
shape of politics on a global scale. (Booth 1999:1)
The need to move away from a culture of nuclearism toward that of human rights
becomes much more stark when viewed through Beck’s (1999) conceptual lenses.
After all, his framework could be used to show how nuclear responses (applauded
within the culture of nuclearism) constitute the very dangers to which they purport
to respond. It could further be used to emphasize the need for the participation of a
variety of actors in managing risksFa process that Thomas (2000) labels
‘‘reviewing global governance.’’ These actors would be expected to contest
prevalent definitions of risk and manufacture others that are in line with their
own perceptions of threat. For example, social movements would challenge
governments’ state-centric conceptions of security by pointing to individual and
societal dimensions of security. Although not all kinds of actors in different parts of
the world would have an equal say in this process, the need for having more
transparency in decision making becomes apparent. By giving more priority to
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practices of both state and nonstate actors as they reflect upon the present and
potential consequences of their own actions for international security.
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